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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Last Clear Chance in Collision
The famous case of Davies v. Mann1 gave birth to the doctrine of
last clear chance by holding that if one party in the exercise of reasonable care has the last opportunity to avoid the harm, the other party's
prior negligence is not a proximate cause of the result. This doctrine
has in most common-law jurisdictions allowed plaintiffs to avoid the
harshness of the bar of contributory negligence, and has shifted the2
burden of the loss to the defendant although both parties were at fault.
Whether this common-law doctrine is applicable in admiralty collision cases has never been decided by the United States Supreme Court.
However, two recent district court decisions serve to point out the
conflict existing among the lower federal courts. In Williamson v. The
Carolina8 the libelant moored his vessel in an unseaworthy manner so
that the displacement waves of the respondent's tug and barge caused
her to be tossed about with resultant damage. Respondent was at fault
in failing to maintain a proper lookout. The court rejected libelant's
contention that respondent, since its"negligence was subsequent in time
to that of libelant's, should bear the total loss. The admiralty rule of
divided damages, the court reasoned, was more equitable where there
was equal fault of both parties.
In Arundel Corp. v. The City of Calcutta4 the libelant's scow collided with respondent's anchored vessel and sank. The court, assuming
that respondent's vessel was improperly anchored and therefore at fault,
held the libelant solely responsible for the- loss, on the theory that it,
being cognizant of the anchored vessel's position, had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision. 5
The divergence of opinion illusirated by the two principal cases is
not resolved by an examination of the history of last clear chance in
admiralty. Steam Dredge No. 16 is apparently the first admiralty-case
in the United States dealing with last clear chance. There the First
Circuit reviewed several Supreme Court decisions 7 in which the facts
110 M.&W. 546 (1842).
2 See PROSsER, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955); Annots., 92 A.L.R. 47 (1934), 119
A.L.R. 1041 (1939), and 171 A.L.R. 365 (1947). See also Note, 36 N.C.L. Rav. 545
'172 F. Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
('I"" F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
' Note that here the respondent or defendant successfully utilized last clear
chance, traditionally a plaintiff's defense to contributory negligence, to avoid
liability.
0134 Fed. 161 (1st Cir. 1904) (not a collision case).
"The New York, 175 U.S. 187 (1899) ; The America, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 432
(1875); Atlee v.Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874) ; The John Fraser,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 184 (1858). Other early Supreme Cour.t cases involving
successive faults where both vessels were held liable are: The North Star, 106
U.S. (16 Otto) 17 (1882) ; The Continental, 81 U.S. '(14 Wall.) 345 (1871).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

would have warranted an application of the doctrine, but in which it
was not mentioned, and concluded that the doctrine of Davies v. Mann
should not be applied in maritime law. Later the Seventh Circuit in
The Norman B. Reams stated that the doctrine of last clear chance was
created to mitigate the common-law principle that contributory negligence is a bar to recovery, and did not apply in this country in admiralty,
since under martime law contributory negligence effects only a division
of damages.
The position taken by Steam Dredge No. 1 and The Norman B.
Ream was weakened by The Perseverance.0 There a vessel was at
fault for being improperly anchored; a tug was at fault in not steering
clear of the anchored vessel. The tug was held solely liable, the anchored
vessel's fault being considered as a mere condition rather than a contributing cause of the collision.' 0 The court stated: "The situation is
similar to that often comprised within the formula that a wrongdoer is
solely liable if he has a 'last clear chance' of avoiding the damage.""
Eight years later the Second Circuit applied last clear chance by name
in The Cornelius Vanderbilt12 and The Sanday.13 Neither case cited
Steam Dredge No. 1 or The Norman B. Ream, nor did either case discuss the doctrine's applicability to admiralty libels-the court apparently assuming that it was applicable. From an overall survey it appears
that, the Second,'1 4 Third, 5 and Fifth'8 Circuits and a district court 17
of the Ninth Circuit have adopted last clear chance, while the First 8
and Seventh Circuits' 9 and a district court 20 of the Fourth Circuit have
rejected it.
8252 Fed. 409 (7th Cir. 1918) (dictum).
63 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1933).
It is often held that the antecedent fault of one vessel is not a contributing
cause if it merely creates a condition or situation which makes it possible for the
subsequent fault of the other vessel to bring about collision. See, e.g., Cornell
Co. v. Phoenix Co., 233 U.S. 593 (1914) ; The Syosset, 71 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1934);
The Socony No. 19, 29 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1928).
11 63 F.2d at 790 (emphasis is added to point out that the court did not consider
itself as applying last clear chance except by analogy).
12120 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1941).
18 122 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1941).
14 Kosnac v. The Norcuba, 243 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1957) ; The Cedar Cliff, 149
F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1945); Southern Transp. Co. v. Dauntless Towing Line, 140
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1944); The Sanday, 122 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1941); The Cornelius Vanderbilt, 120 F2d 766 (2d Cir. 1941); Arundel Corp. v. The City of
Calcutta, 172 F. Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) ; In re Adams' Petition, 125 F. Supp.
110 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Manhattan Lighterage Corp. v. United States, 103 F. Supp.
10

274 op.
(S.D.N.Y.
1951).Co. v. United States,
Dougherty
207 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1952).

18 Crawford v. Indian Towing Co., 240 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Richmond v.
The Connie C. Cenac, 157 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. La. 1957), aff'd sub twm. Cenac
Towing Co. v. Richmond, 265 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1959).
17 Hertz v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
SSteam Dredge No. 1, 134 Fed. 161 (1st Cir. 1904) (not a collision case
Th Norman B. Ream, 252 Fed. 409 (7th Cir. 1918) (dictum).
"Wllamo
v. The Carolina, 158 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.C. 1958). Buet cf.
Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Mansfield, 207 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1953), where, in an
action under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1953), the
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

In attempting to determine what should be the position of the admiralty courts in relation to the doctrine of last clear chance, certain
basic maritime principles of liability and recoverable damages must be
examined. Liability in admiralty collision law is, as at common law,
based on fault. 2 ' The effect of dual fault in admiralty, however, is entirely different from its effect at common law. If only one vessel is at
fault that vessel must bear the entire loss,22 but if both vessels are deemed
at fault the divided damages rule of American admiralty law comes into
play, i.e., each vessel bears half the total loss.23 This rule is qualified
by the "major-minor fault" principle: if one vessel is grossly negligent
and the other at fault only to a minor degree, the minor fault is held not
to be a contributing cause of the accident and the entire loss is borne
by the vessel grossly at fault 24 The result is in many cases the same
as would be reached under last clear chance, but the rule differs from
last clear chance in that it is limited to instances where it would be
unjust to divide the damages because of the gross fault of one vessel and
in that it is not dependent upon one fault preceding the other.
Many of the standards imposed upon the mariner are statutory,2 5
and one who violates a statutory duty before a collision is faced with the
rule of The Pennsylvania.2 6 That rule creates a legal presumption of
fault that may be overcome only by showing not only that the violation
did not but that it could not have been a cause of the collision. Modifying this rule slightly is the doctrine as to errors in extremis. This
doctrine provides that when a vessel, through no fault of her own, is
placed in a position where collision is seemingly imminent, she will not
be held at fault for action taken in violation of the statutory rules or the
be explained as
standards of due care in navigation, when the fault can
27
resulting from the extremity in which she was placed.
court allowed the issue of last clear chance to go to the jury. The court cited no
authority, nor did it discuss the doctrine's applicability to a maritime cause of
action.
21
' The Java, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 189 (1872).
"The Clara, 102 U.S. (12 Otto)" 200 (1880); Oaksmith v. Garner, 205 F.2d
262 (9th Cir. 1953).
.'The North Star, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 17 (1882); The Catherine, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 170 (1855).
",
The Victory, 168 U.S. 410 (1897) ;'The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895) ; The
City of New York, 147 U.S. 72 (1893) ; The Great Republic, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.)

20 (1874).

' International Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 144-47d (1953); Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C.
H8 151-232 (1953) ; Great Lakes Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-95 (1953); Western
Rivers Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-56 (1953). See GlmxoRE & BLACK, ADmmALTY
§7-3 (1957).
2 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Cornell
S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1959). See also GiLmoRE & BLACK, ArDmIALTY § 7-5
(1957); GRinrnr, CoLnISloN § 201 (1949).
" The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852); Pacific-Atlantic S.S.
Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1949); The Stifinder, 275 Fed. 271
(2d Cir. 1921). See also Gi.moRE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY § 7-3 (1957).
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If the admiralty courts were to accept completely the principles of
last clear chance in collision cases, the effect would be in many instances
a nullification of these basic maritime principles. In cases where there
is substantial fault on the part of both vessels, but one is subsequent in
time to the other, the loss, rather than being divided, would be borne
by the last wrongdoer. In this connection it is submitted that the need
for last clear chance in the common law is not present in the maritime
law. The doctrine of last clear chance was designed to mitigate the
harshness of the bar of contributory negligence. In admiralty contributory negligence has never, as a rule, 28 barred recovery, 20 By division of
damages the maritime law has evolved its own equitable adjustment
betveen the parties.
The rule of The Pennsylvania, which in many instances requires at
least a division of damages,30 apparently would be made ineffective, with
the result that the subsequent wrongdoer would bear the total loss regardless of any breach of a statutory 'duty by the other vessel. Since
the doctrine of last clear chance tends to place liability on the last
wrongdoer, it is possible as a practical matter that a vessel making tho
last error could be 'held liable even though her action properly should
be classified under existing admiralty law as a reasonable error in judgment while in extremis and thus excusable.
A view of the overall picture seems to indicate that the doctrine of
last clear chance has no real foundation or place in admiralty law. It
would seem to conflict with some basic maritime principles, while other
admiralty rules, when justice dictates, can be applied to reach the same
result.31 It is submitted that an adoption of this common-law doctrine
by the American maritime courts would result in no real advance, but
rather a regression from the more desirable measures of liability cur32
rently employed.
RICHARD VON BIBERSTEIN, JR.

See discussion of "major-minor fault" rule at text, footnote 24 supra, and
discussion in note 10 supra. As,was stated in Cenac Towing Co. v. Richmond,
265 F.2d 466, 471 -(5th Cir. 1959): "Each case stands on its own. Call it anything: a condition, a remote cause, a non-contributing fault, the last clear chance;
if, in the circumstances of the particular case, the respondent's fault is slight in
comparison with the libellant's or if there was a clear cleavage between respondent's fault and.the collision, an admiralty court will evaluate the respective
degrees of fault and exonterate the respondent."
2" The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
"0See Lie v. San Francisco & Portland S.S. Co., 243 U.S. 291 (1917) ; Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Cornell S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
"' See discussion of "major-minor fault" rule in text at note 24 supra, and
discussion in note 10 supra.
"-Presumably if a collision libel is brought in a state court, that court will be
bound to apply maritime law. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) ; Southport Transit Co. v. Avondale Marine
Ways, Inc., 234 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants
Towboat Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945).
26

